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ABSTRACT
Deceptive and anti-deceptive technologies have been developed for
various specific applications. But there is a significant need for a
general, holistic, and quantitative framework of deception. Game
theory provides an ideal set of tools to develop such a framework
of deception. In particular, game theory captures the strategic and
self-interested nature of attackers and defenders in cybersecurity.
Additionally, control theory can be used to quantify the physical
impact of attack and defense strategies. In this tutorial, we present
an overview of game-theoretic models and design mechanisms for
deception and counter-deception. The tutorial aims to provide a
taxonomy of deception and counter-deception and understand how
they can be conceptualized, quantified, and designed or mitigated.
This tutorial gives an overview of diverse methodologies from game
theory that includes games of incomplete information, dynamic
games, mechanism design theory to offer a modern theoretic un-
derpinning of cyberdeception. The tutorial will also discuss open
problems and research challenges that the HoTSoS community can
address and contribute with an objective to build a multidisciplinary
bridge between cybersecurity, economics, game and decision the-
ory.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→Network security; •Mathematics of
computing; • Theory of computation → Algorithmic game
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ACM Reference Format:
Quanyan Zhu. 2019. Game Theory for Cyber Deception: A Tutorial. In
HoTSoS ’19: Hot Topics in the Science of Security: Symposium and Bootcamp,
April 2–3, 2019, Nashville, TN, USA. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 3 pages.
https://doi.org/10.1145/nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn
TUTORIAL DESCRIPTION
Cyber deception is a technique used to cause human [12, 36] or
computer systems [1, 15, 20] to have false beliefs and behave against
their interests. Cyberspace creates unique opportunities for decep-
tion. Attackers can leverage information asymmetry to misinform
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and mislead the users. For example, phishing is a typical deception-
based attack that is one of the top threat vectors for cyberattacks.
Defenders can also use deception as a way to thwart or deter attacks.
For example, techniques such as honeynets [2, 53], moving target
defense [19, 21, 50], obfuscation [8, 31, 46, 48], and mix networks
[42] have been introduced to create difficulties for attackers to map
out the system information.
Successful deception fundamentally depends on the information
asymmetry between the deceiver and the deceivee [25, 27, 45, 58].
Deceivers can strategically manipulate the private information to
suit their own self-interests. The manipulated information is then
revealed to deceivees, who, on the other hand, make decisions based
on the information received. It is important for the deceivee to form
correct beliefs based on past observations, take into account the
potential damage caused by deception, and strategically use the
observed information for decision-making.
Modeling deception would formally capture the interactions
between an attacker and a defender, provide a quantitative and sys-
tematic understanding of deceptions, and develop new technologies
and incentive mechanisms to mitigate cyber risks and safeguard
the cyberspace. Game-theoretic models are natural frameworks to
capture the adversarial and defensive interactions between players
[22]. It provides a quantitative measure of the quality of protection
with the concept of Nash equilibrium where both defender and
an attacker seek optimal strategies, and no one has an incentive
to deviate unilaterally from their equilibrium strategies despite
their conflict for security objectives. The equilibrium concept also
provides a quantitative prediction of the security outcomes of the
scenario the game model captures. Recently, game theory has been
applied to different sets of security problems, e.g., Stackelberg and
signaling games for deception and proactive defenses [7, 32, 50–
53, 57, 61, 63], (2) network games for cyber-physical security that
deals with critical infrastructure protection and information as-
surance [5, 10, 16, 23, 34, 35, 37–41], dynamic games for adaptive
defense [9, 17–19, 29, 47, 49, 59, 60, 62], and mechanism design
theory for security [4, 6, 13, 14, 43, 44, 54–56].
This tutorial aims to present an overview of game-theoretic
methods and show their applications in different scenarios. More
specifically, we start with a baseline a multi-stage Bayesian game
model with two-sided incomplete information and introduce the
analysis of different variants of the baseline that can be used to
capture different features of cyber deception. The objective of this
tutorial is to introduce diverse methodologies from game theory
that include mechanism design, incentive analysis, decision-making
under incomplete information, and dynamic games to provide solid
underpinnings of cyber deception.
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This tutorial will be structured in the followingway. The first part
of the tutorial introduces a taxonomy of deception from a game-
theoretic perspective [25, 27]. Then, the tutorial introduces the
baseline signal games and the analytical methods for two-person
deception games [3, 28, 30, 47]. We will present the concept of
strategic trust as a defense mechanism that can be designed using
the signaling games [11, 15, 24, 26, 33, 37]. The baseline games can
be further extended to include side-channel information, system
dynamics, and the influence of the third party. The tutorial will also
discuss open problems and research challenges that the HoTSoS
community can address and contribute. With the objective to build
a multidisciplinary bridge between cybersecurity, economics, game
and decision theory, this tutorial will review basic concepts and
provide an overview of recent advances in the field to HoTSoS
community with the hope to establish a community interest in the
science of security and cross-disciplinary researches.
The potential audience includes researchers from academia and
industry, including PhD and graduate students. Some background
in network security and knowledge of basic optimization and data
science is helpful but not necessary.
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